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ABSTRACT 
 
NASA is using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as 
one of the tools in its Safety & Mission Assurance 
(S&MA) tool belt to identify and quantify risks associated 
with human spaceflight.  This paper discusses some of the 
challenges and benefits associated with developing and 
using PRA for NASA human space programs.  Some 
programs have entered operation prior to developing a 
PRA, while some have implemented PRA from the start 
of the program.  It has been observed that the earlier a 
design change is made in the concept or design phase, the 
less impact it has on cost and schedule.  Not finding risks 
until the operation phase yields much costlier design 
changes and major delays, which can result in discussions 
of just accepting the risk.  Risk contributors identified by 
PRA are not just associated with hardware failures.  They 
include but are not limited to crew fatality due to medical 
causes, the environment the vehicle and crew are exposed 
to, the software being used, and the reliability of the crew 
performing required actions.  Some programs have 
entered operation prior to developing a PRA, and while 
PRA can still provide a benefit for operations and future 
design trades, the benefit of implementing PRA from the 
start of the program provides the added benefit of 
informing design and reducing risk early in program 
development. 
 
Currently, NASA’s International Space Station (ISS) 
program is in its 20th year of on-orbit operations around 
the Earth and has several new programs in the design 
phase preparing to enter the operation phase all of which 
have active (or living) PRAs.  These programs incorporate 
PRA as part of their Risk-Informed, Decision-Making 
(RIDM) process.  For new NASA human spaceflight 
programs discussion begins with mission concept, 
establishing requirements, forming the PRA team, and 
continues through the design cycles into the operational 
phase.  Several examples of PRA related applications and 
observed lessons are included.   
 
 
 
1.  BACKGROUND 
 
The fundamentals of PRA had their start in the early 
1960’s as a way to evaluate the safety of designing and 
operating Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM’s) via 
fault trees.  The approach showed value in identifying and 
analyzing risks in other industries.   
 
In the early 1960’s, NASA used reliability analysis to 
assess the likelihood of making it to the moon and back 
safely as President Kennedy stated.  However, the results 
of the assessment revealed a higher risk than NASA 
believed and abandoned the analysis effort.  The program 
resulted in only one of the lunar excursions failing to meet 
its mission objectives while returning the crew home 
safely.   
 
A decade later, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) picked up PRA for the 1975 Reactor Safety Study 
(RSS).[1]  Previously, the Atomic Energy Commission 
and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) used Design 
Basis Accidents (DBAs) to evaluate reactor and plant 
designs.  DBAs are worst case, multiple failure, events.  
After the study was complete, it was book shelfed.  
Following the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979, 
someone recalled that the RSS revealed a similar scenario.  
A review of the RSS findings confirmed the scenario and 
the NRC concluded that PRA had a use in identifying and 
analyzing potential scenarios at nuclear power plants.  
Additional studies of other plants were performed, 
research on methodology improvement resulted in an 
approach with much more capability.  The TMI accident 
showed that the more likely scenarios had as much or 
more risk than the worst case scenarios.  PRA introduced 
a best-estimate risk approach to evaluate plant designs and 
operations instead of DBAs, which assumed worst case 
scenarios.  By 1990, the NRC required every US nuclear 
power plant (more than 100) to perform an Individual 
Plant Examination (IPE), which was accomplished using 
PRA.  Some plants attempted to satisfy the IPE using other 
methods but failed and eventually used PRA to meet the 
requirement.  PRA is used in the nuclear industry to 
evaluate and improve designs of both already built and 
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 those being built or planned.  PRA was shown to be useful 
in the design process and during operation.  Operating 
procedures and operator training were both improved.   
 
Following the Challenger accident in 1986, the Rogers 
Commission recommended that NASA use PRA to 
evaluate the Shuttle design and operation.[2]  NASA 
started by applying PRA to evaluate nuclear payload 
launches for ascent only.  Later, a 1995 PRA was 
performed for ascent and descent operations with minimal 
in-space application.  By 2001, the Shuttle Program 
sanctioned a full scope PRA that was interrupted by the 
Columbia accident.  An independent peer review (IPR) 
sponsored by NASA’s Office of Safety & Mission 
Assurance (OSMA) was performed in 2003.  
Recommendations were made and accepted.  The Shuttle 
PRA evolved as post-Columbia accident improvements 
were being added, such as in-space heat shield inspections 
and repair capabilities.   
 
After the Shuttle program concluded in 2011, the Shuttle 
PRA was used to evaluate the effectiveness of design 
changes or upgrades over the life of the program since 
1981.  The Shuttle PRA showed the estimated risk of 
flying the Shuttle at the end of program was 
approximately 1 in 90.  Removing each upgrade one 
mission at a time showed that the risk of flying STS-1 in 
1981 was about 1 in 10.[3]  In other words, the initial flight 
risk of the Shuttle was about an order of magnitude greater 
than it was at the end of the program.  This surprised some, 
but not all.  In the early 1980’s, it was believed by 
management that flying the Shuttle was about 1 in 
100,000, whereas engineers believed it to be about 1 in 
100.  Dr. Richard Feynman (the Nobel laureate asked to 
be a member of the Roger’s Commission for the 
Challenger Accident) also pointed out that the estimates 
that NASA had developed for main engine failure could 
not possibly be as reliable as quoted.[4]  However, not 
until the Shuttle PRA was performed did anybody have a 
basis for more realistic estimates.  This effort was also 
very informative to estimate the risk of future first flights 
when only the mature or design capable risk estimate is 
known prior to flight. 
 
 
In February 2008, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
(ASAP) pointed out the need to establish risk targets and 
minimal levels of safety to encourage free discussion 
among various design participants at both the program 
level and the safety requirement level.  In July 2010, the 
ASAP was briefed on the three levels of acceptable 
mission risk.  The first level, the Agency Threshold, sets 
the agency’s quantifiable risk tolerance for the program or 
mission that is required to be reported to the 
Administrator.  The second level, the Program design and 
mission requirement, sets the “design to” level which 
allows for margin to the threshold to cover unknowns and 
uncertainty early in design.  The third level, the Agency 
Long Term Goal, sets the expectation of continuous 
improvement.  In March 2011, OSMA recommended the 
first Agency Risk Tolerance Thresholds and Goals for an 
ISS Mission.[5]  
 
2.  PRA OVERVIEW 
 
PRA is a comprehensive, structured, and disciplined 
approach to identifying and analyzing risk in engineered 
systems and/or processes.[6]  It attempts to quantify rare 
event probabilities of failures.  It attempts to take into 
account all possible events or influences that could 
reasonably affect the system or process being studied.  It 
is inherently and philosophically a Bayesian 
methodology.  In general, PRA is a process that seeks 
answers to three basic questions: 
 
− What kinds of events or scenarios can occur (i.e., 
what can go wrong)? 
− What are the likelihoods and associated 
uncertainties of the events or scenarios? 
− What consequences could result from these events 
or scenarios (e.g., Loss of Crew, Loss of Mission, 
Loss of Hydrocarbon Containment during deep sea 
oil drilling, Nuclear Reactor Core Damage 
Frequency)? 
 
Figure 1 shows an overview of the PRA process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Overview 
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 NASA’s OSMA established a procedures guide for the 
agency.[7]  However, it leaves off at a higher level than is 
needed by each program to implement within the program.  
Therefore, a more program specific PRA methodology 
document is established to provide clearer guidance to 
each program’s PRA analysts.   
 
3.  SPACE SHUTTLE  
 
The Space Shuttle program flew from April 1981 to July 
2011.  The Space Shuttle was comprised of five elements; 
Orbiter, Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), Solid 
Rocket Boosters (SRBs), Reusable Solid Rocket Motors 
(RSRMs) and the External Tank (ET).  During its 30 year 
lifetime, the Space Shuttle flew 135 missions to Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO).  Two of those missions resulted in 
catastrophic events (i.e.  Challenger and Columbia 
accidents).   
 
Following the Challenger accident in 1986, work began 
on proof of concepts for PRA modeling of selected Shuttle 
systems followed by “ascent only” assessments in support 
of nuclear payload missions.  In 2001, the Shuttle Program 
Manager sanctioned a full scope Shuttle PRA (SPRA).  
Each of the five Shuttle elements was responsible for 
generating a PRA model of its element, which was to be 
integrated into the SPRA.  By 2003, the baseline was 
completed and an independent peer review was 
performed.  As increasing fidelity and expansion of the 
modeling scope occurred over the following years, the 
SPRA risk varied.  The SPRA yielded a mission 
assessment from T-5 minutes (Orbiter auxiliary power 
units start) to wheel stop.  This evolution is shown in 
Figure 2.  The final mean estimated risk of the Shuttle was 
1 in 90 with a 5th percentile of 1 in 127 and a 95th percentile 
of 1 in 63.  The error factor (i.e.  Measure of uncertainty) 
was estimated at 1.4 considering the improvements that 
had been made, these results were consistent with an 
empirical calculation of 2 failures in 135 missions which 
gives a 1 in 68 probability of LOCV.   
 
 
Figure 2. Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Development 
Early in the program, two qualitative risk assessments 
were made.  These were not PRAs.  The Wiggins Analysis 
[8] in 1982 put the overall risk of losing a Shuttle between 
1 in 500 and 1 in 5000, which was mainly based on 
engineering judgment.  The Weatherwax Analysis [9] in 
1983 put the overall risk of losing a Shuttle at 1 in 35.  It 
was a review of the Wiggins analysis with a more data-
based approach.  The Weatherwax report mentioned 
Nuclear PRAs and inclusion of other risks such as 
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) and crew error, which 
are included in PRAs. 
 
The Space Shuttle program actively used PRA the last half 
of the program, not as something to meet a requirement 
but as an indicator of what risks it was facing.  
Unfortunately, the PRA results were coming out at about 
the time of the Columbia accident in 2003.  Following the 
Columbia accident, the Shuttle PRA was completed and 
used by program management to address the top risk 
drivers.  For example, the Shuttle program manager would 
start at the top risk driver and work his way down to #10 
asking what is being done and what can be done for each 
risk driver.  The Top 8 represented ~80% of the estimated 
risk in 2003 and by the end of the program in 2011 the Top 
10 represented about 70%.  There were 97 Shuttle PRA 
(SPRA) applications and special assessments that were 
performed by the Shuttle PRA Team (SPRAT) between 
return to flight from Columbia and end of the Shuttle 
program.  Examples of applications and special 
assessments that utilize the Shuttle PRA include:  Hubble 
Space Telescope Service Mission 4, potential crew rescue 
of the last mission (STS-135), dual docked operations, 
emergency de-orbit, and entry overflight risk.  Special 
assessments include:  flow control valve, engine cutoff 
sensor failures, power bus isolation supply, and 
oscillations of the Orbiter docking system.   
 
To maintain the SPRA as current, it was updated about 
every year and referred to as Iterations.  There were seven 
Iterations after the baseline in 2003.  Each Iteration 
included an increase in scope and updated data.   
 
Another finding from the Shuttle program PRA was the 
difference between when the risk was initiated to when it 
was realized.  For example, the thermal protection system 
(TPS) of the wing leading edge on the Orbiter could be 
damaged during ascent, but loss of crew would not be 
realized until re-entry as was the case for the Columbia 
accident.  This meant that on-orbit inspection could 
identify a damaged TPS and allow time to make some 
repairs.  It was not a guarantee as some damages could not 
be repaired and some could not be detected.  This is 
 important to consider for future spacecraft returning to 
Earth.   
 
The Shuttle is a very reliable vehicle in comparison with 
other launch systems.  Much of the risk posed by Shuttle 
operations is related to fundamental aspects of the 
spacecraft design and the environments in which it 
operates.  It was unreasonable to assume that significant 
design improvements could be implemented to address 
these risks in the operations phase of the program versus 
earlier in the design / development phase.  Risk 
assessments, like the SPRA, could help identify and 
analyze these contributors early in the design process to 
determine whether a design change is warranted. 
 
The SPRA provides a cornerstone for future human space 
programs to benefit from by knowing what can and has 
been done previously to identify and analyze risk 
contributors in the continuous risk management process.  
SSP management viewed the SPRA results as one of many 
inputs in their risk-informed decision making process.   
 
4.  INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION (ISS)  
 
The ISS is a joint program between five participating 
space agencies:  the US National Aeronautical and Space 
Agency (NASA), Russia’s Roscosmos, Japan’s JAXA, 
the European Space Agency (ESA), and the Canadian 
Space Agency (CSA).  The ISS is a space station, or 
habitable artificial satellite, in low Earth orbit about 250 
miles up.  The first element of the ISS went up in 1998, 
with the first long-term residents arriving in November 
2000.  It has been inhabited continuously for 20 years and 
expected to operate until 2030.  The last pressurized 
module was added in 2011.  It is approximately 250 feet 
long and 360 feet wide with a habitable volume of 
approximately 33,000 cubic feet and circling the Earth 
every 92 minutes at 17,100 mph.  It can be seen with the 
naked eye from Earth.  Approximately 240 people from 
18 countries have visited it to date and over 2200 
experiments have been performed.  
 
Its PRA effort started in 1999.  An independent peer 
review team reviewed the ISS PRA in 2002 and again in 
2010 after the PRA was restarted to correct initial issues.  
Findings were made and incorporated.  The scope of the 
ISS PRA was the complete state of the vehicle and not its 
construction.  It included hardware, medical, and 
Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) risks.  A 
fire study was performed in 2011.   That established a new 
methodology to more accurately assess the fire risk to the 
ISS from all known sources of ignition.  Though 
ultimately the quantified risk value was low, the 
consequences of fire are extremely high.  The PRA 
analysis enabled the program to identify categories of risk 
and mitigate potential sources based upon their risk 
contribution.   
 
The ISS does not have an overall LOC requirement, but 
does assess the probability of LOC and evacuation as well 
as several loss of station end states.  The PRA is used, 
similar to SSP, to identify, assess, and mitigate risk.  
Examples include MMOD studies to mitigate exposure to 
key components and systems, evaluation of critical 
failures such as the ammonia heat exchanger that failed 
and was replaced on orbit, and space vehicle risk as an 
emergency return option for crew members.   
 
 
5.  CROSS PROGRAM 
 
NASA’s Cross Program or Exploration Systems 
Development (ESD) program is currently the integration 
of three individual NASA programs:  Orion, Space 
Launch Systems (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems 
(EGS).  Future mission programs may include Deep Space 
Gateway, lunar lander, etc.  Each program has a role in 
getting NASA back to the moon.  Orion is the spacecraft, 
similar to Apollo.  SLS is the launch vehicle, similar to the 
Saturn V.  EGS provides the ground support systems prior 
to launch and post-landing.  Each program is responsible 
for performing and developing its PRA.  Both Orion and 
SLS have LOC requirements.  EGS does not because it 
was believed to have insignificant risk as compared to 
Orion and SLS.  However, the Cross Program PRA 
(XPRA) includes EGS to capture the overall risk 
associated with each mission.  The cross program only has 
one probability of Loss of Crew (LOC) requirement, the 
combined ascent risk of 1 in 400.  Both Orion and SLS 
have an ascent LOC requirement and Orion has an Entry, 
Descent, and Landing (EDL) LOC requirement.  The 
XPRA assesses the risk from crew ingress to “boots on 
deck”.  Boots on deck is defined here as when the crew is 
loaded on a vessel or location with complete medical 
facility (i.e.  Not a life raft or helicopter).  This requires 
assessing ground support systems, external events, and the 
complete mission.  Since 2014, the NASA Administrator 
has established an agency LOC threshold of 1 in 75 for 
cis-lunar missions [10], such as what EM-1 and EM-2 are 
planned to fly.  EM refers to Exploration Mission.  Note 
that EM-1 is currently planned to be an un-crewed vehicle 
flying a mission around the moon, thus LOC does not 
apply.  Another end state or top event is used for EM-1, 
i.e.  probability of Loss of Orion Vehicle (LOOV).  EM-2 
is currently planned to be the first crewed mission.  In 
addition to agency LOC thresholds and program LOC 
 requirements, the ESD program has also established 
Technical Performance Measures (TPMs) which provide 
a “warning track” approach for each major requirement, 
as shown in Table 1.  Therefore, providing a three tiered 
approach to these LOC requirements.  If the estimated risk 
of any monitored risk rises above the TPM, then a “trip 
wire” occurs to inform management that estimated risk is 
approaching the program requirement.  If the estimated 
risk continues to rise above the Program LOC 
Requirements, management is again flagged to respond.  
This time action is required.  However, if the estimated 
risk rises above the Agency LOC Threshold, then the 
NASA Administrator becomes involved to discuss with 
the program.   
 
 
Pre-launch 
and Ascent 
In-Space 
EDL 
and 
Post 
Landing 
Mission 
 
SLS Orion SLS Orion Orion 
Agency 
Threshold 
1 in 300 1 in 150 1 in 300 1 in 75 
ESD 
Reqmt 
1 in 
550 
1 in 
1400 
N/A N/A 1 in 650 TBD 
ESD TPM 
Objective 
1 in 400 
TPM 1.a 
N/A N/A N/A 
1 in 130 
TPM 4.a 
 
Table 1. ESD Loss of Crew (LOC) Requirements and 
Technical Performance Metrics (TPM) 
 
The SLS Block 1 configuration consists of a core stage, 
solid rocket boosters, and the upper stage.  The core stage 
includes four RS-25s, liquid Hydrogen (LH2) and liquid 
Oxygen (LO2) tanks.  Two solid rocket boosters with five 
segments each are used for additional thrust during the 
first ~120 seconds of ascent.  The Block 1 upper stage, 
which is referred to the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion 
Stage (ICPS), is a liquid oxygen / liquid hydrogen 
(LO2/LH2) based system that performs the Perigee Raise 
Maneuver (PRM).  Orion’s service module will perform 
the Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) burn for EM-2.   
 
SLS’s LOC requirement is 1 in 550 and 1 in 85 for ascent 
probability of Loss of Mission (LOM).  SLS LOM means 
that SLS cannot achieve the mission objective and Orion 
is now challenged to escape and safely return via its 
launch abort system.  The SLS is essentially divided into 
core stage and upper stage.  The core stage takes the 
vehicle from launch pad to ~8.5 minutes into ascent.  The 
upper stage covers the rest of ascent and depending on the 
mission profile into a LEO or TLI burn.   
 
The SLS PRA is used to verify its LOC requirements as 
well as for several trade studies to help ensure that it meets 
its requirements.  A couple of examples of these trade 
studies are MMOD risk reduction, abort triggers, and 
alternate Main Engine Cutoff (MECO) targets.   SLS 
performed a trade study on MMOD risk reduction trades 
for both EM-1 and EM-2.  PRA was used for trigger 
selection and evaluation of abort triggers, which included 
adding a command authority trigger to protect the crew 
against an all TVC hard over failure.  Another crew safety 
possibility would be the alternate MECO target to allow 
reaching a safe orbit in the case of an engine shutdown.  
PRA shows benign liquid engine shutdown to be one of 
the risk drivers.  PRA was a key tool for adding 
redundancy to the SLS systems. 
 
The Orion Program provides the Orion spacecraft, which 
consist of a Crew Module (CM), a Service Module (SM), 
a Spacecraft Adaptor (SA), and a Launch Abort System 
(LAS).  The SM is comprised of two subcomponents:  the 
Crew Module Adapter (CMA) and the European Service 
Module (ESM).  The ESM is provided by the European 
Space Agency (ESA).  Lockheed Martin (LM) provides 
the other Orion components.   
- The Orion CM is a pressurized, crewed element 
that houses the crew members from lift-off to lunar 
orbit and brings the crew members safely back to 
the Earth’s surface at the end of a mission. The 
Orion CM provides all services necessary to 
support the crew members while onboard for the 
EM-2 mission.  
- The ESM, which is attached to the CM by the 
CMA, provides services to the CM in the form of 
propulsion, consumables storage, heat rejection, 
and power generation. The Orion provides power 
and data interfaces for unpressurized cargo and 
secondary payloads within the SM.  
- The LAS provides an abort capability to safely 
transport the CM away from the launch vehicle 
stack in the event of an emergency on the launch 
pad or during the first few minutes of ascent.  The 
LAS is jettisoned after the SM fairings have been 
safely jettisoned. 
Orion’s LOC requirements are 1 in 1400 for ascent and 1 
in 650 for EDL.  The Orion PRA was used for several risk 
trade studies during its development.  For example, the 
PRA was used to evaluate the comparative risk between 
SM serial and parallel propulsion systems, provide risk 
rankings for various docking system designs, and to 
evaluate cross connection capabilities in the fuel supply 
section of the propulsion system. 
 
 The EGS Program provides the systems and capabilities 
to process, launch and then recovery of the Orion 
spacecraft and crew after landing.  For this analysis, only 
the systems involved in launch preparation, launch and 
recovery are analyzed; these include the following. 
- At the launch pad, EGS Ground Support 
Equipment systems risk are quantified during SLS 
vehicle final cryogenic propellant servicing, 
through launch countdown, and launch from 
Launch Complex 39 Pad B at the Kennedy Space 
Center. 
- For recovery, either following a nominal mission or 
an abort, EGS provides capabilities to locate, 
rescue, and transport the spacecraft and crew after 
landing. 
EGS has no LOC requirement, however a PRA is 
performed to understand the program’s mission risk 
related to both pre-launch and post-landing.  EGS’s LOC 
risk includes ground operations performed while the crew 
is on board during pre-launch, abort rescue operations, 
and nominal post-landing rescue operations.  PRA was 
used to assist in preliminary emergency egress system 
design and operations, as well as landing and rescue 
operations for both nominal and off-nominal conditions.  
Off-nominal refers to ascent and in-space aborts.  In other 
words, will the crew be landing in the Atlantic, Indian, or 
Pacific Ocean?   
 
6.  COMMERCIAL CREW  
 
The Commercial Crew Program (CCP) began in 2010 
with the intent to develop commercial partnerships to 
transport astronauts to the ISS.  There are currently two 
partners (Boeing and SpaceX) developing spacecraft with 
initial crewed test flights to be launched in 2019.  SpaceX 
launched an un-crewed mission to ISS in March 2019.  
Each spacecraft will eventually dock to ISS and remain 
there for around six months and return the crew safely to 
Earth. 
 
Each partner is responsible for developing a PRA to 
capture LOC and LOM end states.  LOC includes faults 
initiated by the Crew Transportation System (CTS) from 
the beginning of crew ingress, prior to launch, through 
crew egress during rescue.  The CTS is the collection of 
all space-based and ground-based systems (encompassing 
hardware and software) used to conduct space missions or 
support activity in space, including, but not limited to, the 
integrated space vehicle, space-based communication and 
navigation systems, launch systems, and mission/launch 
control.  LOM includes faults initiated by the CTS which 
lead to an ascent abort or termination of the mission earlier 
than the pre-launch planned end of mission timeframe, 
stranding the crew on ISS requiring a rescue vehicle, 
inability to dock with the ISS and LOC. 
 
CCP utilizes the PRA for verification of LOC and LOM 
requirements.  CCP LOC and LOM requirements were 
established based upon Constellation LOC and LOM 
requirements at the end of the program.  Constellation 
LOC requirements were derived based upon a 
combination of engineering judgement, Shuttle PRA, and 
initial estimates of Orion risks.   There were two separate 
LOC requirements set:  an overall LOC requirement of 1 
in 270 and an Ascent plus Entry LOC requirement of 1 in 
500.  The Constellation LOM requirement was based upon 
Soyuz LOM estimates and the ISS Program’s desire to be 
as good as Soyuz.  In addition, separate agency thresholds 
of 1 in 150 for overall mission risk and 1 in 300 for Ascent 
plus Entry risk was established in 2011 for an ISS mission 
and applied to both NASA programs conducting such 
missions and commercial crew transportation.[5]  Each 
partner produced a list of their top risk drivers and 
compared their overall risk estimate to the program 
requirement. 
 
7.  GATEWAY 
 
Gateway is a planned lunar orbital space habitat.  Its 
purpose is to provide a staging platform for lunar 
operations and for future deep space missions, such as to 
Mars.  As of April 2019, Gateway is made up eight of 
elements and modules:  the Power and Propulsion 
Element (PPE), the European System Providing Refueling 
Infrastructure and Telecommunications (ESPRIT)/US 
Utilization Module, an International Habitat (International 
Partner Habitation (I-HAB) Module), a domestic habitat 
(US-HAB Module), an Airlock, Logistics Modules, and a 
Robotic Arm as shown on Figure 3.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Current Gateway Architecture 
 
 The Gateway PRA is being developed by NASA at the 
Gateway Program level so that a consistent PRA 
methodology will be utilized across modules and 
elements.  The PRA will evaluate both LOC and LOM.  
LOC includes Gateway initiated faults from crew entering 
the Gateway approach ellipsoid to crew departure from 
Gateway ellipsoid.  The approach ellipsoid is a designate 
area around Gateway centered on the Gateway center of 
mass.  Initiated by Gateway includes external events 
which result in Gateway failure (e.g. MMOD, radiation, 
etc.) and includes human error associated with operating 
Gateway but excludes events initiated by Orion which are 
captured in Orion LOC and LOM estimates (e.g. docking 
event initiated by Orion).  Crew medical risk is planned to 
be covered at the mission level including both Orion and 
Gateway.  The Gateway Preliminary PRA was created to 
help establish LOC and LOM requirements, as was done 
for the Cross Program, and to help with early design 
trades.  The Gateway Preliminary PRA utilizes ISS PRA, 
Orion PRA and satellite reliability analysis as surrogates 
for the Gateway systems.  It is not a detailed model of 
Gateway as there are no specific designs to evaluate.  As 
the design matures, a more detailed PRA will evolve to 
eventually be used to verify LOC and LOM requirements 
at the program level. 
 
The Gateway program is taking a new approach to LOC 
and LOM requirements by not allocating LOC and LOM 
requirements to elements/modules.  Instead Gateway is 
allocating hardware reliability requirements which are 
consistent with Gateway LOC and LOM requirements.  
The Gateway elements are required to provide PRA 
support information necessary to perform the PRA which 
includes the reliability data as well as supporting the 
Gateway PRA working group.  This approach was 
proposed based upon a lesson learned from CCP.  Since 
the Program is responsible for meeting the LOC 
requirement, there is a risk that the elements/modules 
could meet the hardware reliability requirements but the 
Program is not meeting LOC or LOM requirements.  This 
risk is believed to be low because of the way the 
requirements were derived and was accepted by the 
Program.  Although LOC and LOM requirements were 
proposed for Gateway as part of the Gateway Formulation 
Sync Review (FSR), they are currently “To Be Resolved” 
(TBR) pending resolution of the Agency LOC threshold 
and confirmation of achievability of the Element hardware 
reliability requirements.     
 
In addition to helping set the LOC, LOM and hardware 
reliability requirements, the preliminary PRA has been 
used to perform early design trades.  An example of this 
is the evaluation of Thermal Control System (TCS) 
architecture options including single and dual loop 
configurations with both fluid and heat exchanger cross-
strapping capability.  Another example included 
evaluating the impact of providing a self-rescue capability 
for Gateway Extravehicular Activities (EVAs). 
 
Due to the planned operational approach with Gateway, 
only periodically crewed but mainly un-crewed, 
evaluating maintenance and repair may be a challenge.  
Capability to perform robotic maintenance and repair is 
being explored. When integrating Gateway risks into the 
Cross-Program PRA, the PRA model needs to capture the 
potential degraded state of Gateway at launch of Orion.  
This is a new challenge since all other NASA PRAs have 
assumed that the vehicle is fully operational at beginning 
of a mission.  This capability could help identify if 
additional Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) are needed to 
address Gateway failures. 
 
 
8.  FUTURE HUMAN SPACE PROGRAMS 
 
Work is already beginning on the human and robotic lunar 
landers.  PRA is planned for the human lander, not sure 
what will be done for the robotic lander.  Eventually, a 
lunar base may occur in order to provide a more 
substantial presence on the moon in preparation for 
missions to Mars.  Work is getting exciting, as well as 
challenging.   
 
It is proposed that NASA continue to use PRA to help 
identify, quantify, and mitigate risks for future space 
missions during the concept, design, and operational 
phases.  PRA provides a systematic approach to looking 
at what can go wrong (how things fail) and the 
corresponding likelihood of these failure scenarios.  
Human space exploration faces an enormous number of 
scenarios that could result in catastrophe.  PRA is one of 
the tools that NASA uses to help improve the likelihood 
of mission success by identifying and ranking the risks for 
management to make risk-informed decisions.   
 
Each human space program after the Space Shuttle 
Program has yielded leadership with differing views of 
PRA and its use.  The process is valid, if performed 
consistently.  Consistency varies by how programs are 
established and the PRA team gets divided and biased to 
produce a PRA.  Forward plans should produce PRAs at 
higher levels to allow consistency as well as promote 
reliability analysis at the lower/project/element levels.  
PRA is not the answer to all questions, but it is a valuable 
tool for design and operations.   
 
 Several lessons have been derived from human space 
program PRA development and applications to date.  I 
can’t say they were all learned, since each of the follow-
on programs didn’t use some of them until now with 
Gateway.   
 
• Establish project management and funding 
through the same path.  If you don’t, your team will 
have different bosses thus you will not have a team! 
 
• Establish a single overall PRA technical authority.  
Don’t call desired methods as guidelines, if you want 
the team to follow them.  Admiral Hyman Rickover 
(US Navy) often stated that “Responsibility is a 
unique concept... You may share it with others, but 
your portion is not diminished.  You may delegate it, 
but it is still with you... If responsibility is rightfully 
yours, no evasion, or ignorance or passing the blame 
can shift the burden to someone else.  Unless you can 
point your finger at the man who is responsible when 
something goes wrong, then you have never had 
anyone really responsible.” [11] 
 
• Begin with the end in mind, which sounds simple 
but is difficult to implement.  Get the Hazard 
analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), and PRA teams working together versus 
answering the same questions with different 
approaches in separate silos or divisions.  Mission 
phase definition is very important as the number of 
potential phases increases the complexity of the 
model orders of magnitude.  For example, abort 
modeling from ascent to on-orbit initiated.  A 
functional hazard analysis appears to be a good way 
to coordinate between hazard and PRA teams, but 
NASA still needs to demonstrate that from beginning 
to end.   
 
• Document, document, document (capture the 
basis of the PRA) provide traceability (the rabbit 
trail) of assumptions to results, if you wait to 
document after presenting the results you will be 
embarrassed as a minimum.  Have you ever 
wondered what you did yesterday, last week, last 
year?  That’s the first reason why we document!  
Second, you always find mistakes and/or holes/gaps 
when documenting your work because you’re 
thinking it through clearer and more focused.  The 
sooner you do this, the quicker you arrive at a 
reasonable and defendable assessment.  Point to the 
engineering or design analysis that supports your 
assumptions.  If they don’t exist, then have the 
domain expert that told you to make that assumption 
to state and defend the case instead of the analyst.  
This keeps the right people involved.  Finally, some 
PRA teams farm out work to third parties.  If the third 
party doesn’t document what they did and why, then 
the primary team will most likely not understand its 
basis and lead to poor decisions. 
 
• Get buy in from domain experts early (i.e. before 
going to present to management).  Start with a good 
analysis team made up of domain experts (e.g. 
subsystem engineers, operators / crew, life scientists, 
external event experts, fire / explosion experts, etc.) 
and experienced analysts (system modelers, data 
analysts, integration modelers, human / software 
analysts, etc.) as needed.  This produces the failure 
logic and data inputs.   Go over the failure logic, data, 
and results with the original team, then share with an 
independent set of domain experts to ensure that it is 
defendable as a best-estimate (not conservative or 
optimistic). Now when you arrive in front of 
management, the team presents and defends the 
assessment as one instead of the PRA analyst alone. 
 
• Start the independent peer review process up 
front by reviewing the plan with them, then 
coming back later to ensure that the plan was 
followed correctly.  (Plan your work, work your 
plan).  The peer review should cover both the 
scope/content of the PRA (the domain being 
modeled) as well as the PRA methodology to be used.  
Make sure you are ready for the peer review.  
 
• Configuration control should be initiated when the 
PRA is initiated.  PRA’s are designed and developed 
via an iterative process as knowledge and data is 
gained, thus there will be several versions along the 
way.  Keep track of what goes into each version 
(input) and the corresponding output (results).  As 
designs and information changes, so does the PRA.  
This is why you hear “Living PRA”. 
 
• PRA is a specialized field and that for those not 
familiar with performing PRA, it takes years to 
develop the expertise needed.  Significant time can 
be wasted during the critical time between the 
Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design 
Review where PRA could be utilized to inform design 
decisions.  It is important to have an experienced team 
from the beginning performing the PRA. 
 
We are still learning and trying to improve.  Our challenge 
is communication between analysts, engineering, 
operations, and management.  Analysts need to talk and 
 be consistent across systems, elements, and programs.  
This becomes hampered when multiple organizations and 
companies are involved and on different sides of the 
requirements fence.  Engineering, operations (ground and 
flight), and health/medical are the domain experts that 
work with the analysts to comprise the “Analysis Team”.  
Together, these team members access the 
vehicle/mission/crew to perform the mission PRA.  As a 
result, the Team goes to management to share what has 
been learned and answer management’s questions as to 
what can be done to reduce risk.   
 
Human space travel and exploration is a risky business.  
The probability of losing the crew associated with 
launching from and returning to Earth with current 
technology is on the order of 1 in 100 to 1 in 200 with 
minimal in-space activity.  As mission duration, number 
of dockings and landings (mission complexity), number 
of EVAs and the number of crew increases, the risk 
increases.  Estimates can and are being made to help guide 
mission architecture and vehicle design.  The question is 
how much risk is too much or acceptable.  It depends on 
the mission objectives, e.g. flying to low Earth orbit, 
landing on the moon, or landing on Mars.  As we go 
beyond LEO, ascent and descent from Earth becomes a 
lower risk contributor to overall mission risk.  NASA uses 
a risk-informed decision-making process.  Knowing what 
is acceptable risk, establishes requirements.  Using PRA 
to estimate the expected risk to establish those 
requirements helps ensure that they are reasonable and 
achievable.  Space mission risk is more than hardware 
related.  It includes the environment (e.g. MMOD, 
radiation), the crew (e.g. human reliability, health), and 
software reliability as automation increases.  
Underappreciated risks can be best addressed by qualified 
and unbiased PRA teams.  The challenge will always be 
identifying and addressing unknown-unknown risks 
before they are realized.  Risk analysts, mission planners, 
and system/vehicle designers must be vigilante and well 
informed to take us “safely” to the next level of human 
space missions.  Risk averse and risk taking are 
consistently being addressed as we pick up where we left 
off 50 years ago and return to working on the moon and 
beyond.   
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